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In this paper, I focus on Schopenhauer’s account of agency. I propose a distinction 
between a narrow and a broader account. According to the former, Schopenhauer 
emphasizes the extent to which our actions are fully determined by our cognition of 
motives and our character, leaving only a negative role for freedom. The broader 
account, on the other hand, reveals a very different picture of Schopenhauer’s account of 
agency, one that is characterized by his emphasis not only on a positive sense of freedom 
but also on action as an expression of existential cognition and insight. 
 





Although Schopenhauer’s explicit theory of agency may seem simple in its 
outline, when considered more closely it presents, as is usually the case with 
many topics in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, a series of seemingly aporetic 
contradictions. This is the case not only when we consider his theory of agency 
apart from the rest of his system, but also, and especially, when we consider it in 
the broad context of his thinking as a whole. In this paper, I intend to examine 
this theory in the light of the notions of affirmation and negation of the will.  
At first sight, it may seem that the doctrines of affirmation and negation of the 
will are already part of Schopenhauer’s theory of agency, such that when I 
propose that we establish a relation between them and his theory of action, I’m 
actually establishing a relation between a part of the doctrine and its whole. It 
should be noted, however, that Schopenhauer scarcely mentions these doctrines 
in connection with his discussion of action, character and freedom in §55 of The 
 
1 This work is funded by national funds through the FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a 
Tecnologia, I.P., under the Norma Transitória –DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0035. 
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World as Will and Representation2 and in the Two Fundamental Problems of 
Ethics, just two of the main sources of his account of agency. Accordingly, I 
propose that we should make a distinction between Schopenhauer’s theory of 
agency in its narrow sense, which includes his accounts of action, character and 
freedom (which is roughly covered in §55 of WWV I), from his broader account of 
action (which forms the subject of book IV of WWV I) taken as whole. The former 
is characterized by the idea of the primacy of the will (or character) over the 
intellect, of the instrumental character of the latter, and can be seen as an almost 
naturalistic account of agency. In this context, Schopenhauer also emphasizes the 
fact that our actions are completely determined by the conjunction of our 
(individual) character, motives and knowledge of the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves. His broad theory of agency, on the other hand, which is linked to 
the doctrines of affirmation, negation and self-knowledge of the will, can be 
 
2 Throughout the paper, I will refer to the Hübscher edition of Schopenhauer’s works. English 
translations are taken from the Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer’s works. Page numbers for 
the Hübscher edition are provided in the margins of the latter.  
Abbreviations of Schopenhauer’s Works used in this paper: 
FW=Über die Freiheit des Willens in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 4, Die zwei Grundprobleme der 
Ethik, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1972 (On the Freedom of the Will in The Two Fundamental 
Problems of Ethics, The Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer's Works, Eng. trans. by C. Janaway, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009).  
GM=Über die Grundlage der Moral in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 4, Die zwei Grundprobleme der 
Ethik, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1972 (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, The Cambridge 
Edition of Schopenhauer's Works, Eng. trans. by C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009). 
PP II=Parerga und Paralipomena, vol. 2, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 6, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1972 
(Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2, The Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer’s Works, Eng. 
trans. by A. dal Caro-C. Janaway, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015). 
SG=Über den vierfachen Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grund in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1, 
Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1972  (in On the Fourfold Root of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings, The Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer's 
Works, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012). 
SG1=Über den vierfachen Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grund (1813) in Sämtliche 
Werke, vol. 7, Dissertation. Gestrichenes. Zitate. Register, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1972 (in On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings, The Cambridge Edition 
of Schopenhauer's Works, Eng. Trans. by D. Cartwright-E. Erdmann-C. Janaway, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2012). 
WWV I=Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. 1, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2, Brockhaus, 
Wiesbaden 1972 (translated in English as The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, The 
Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer's Works, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010). 
WWV II=Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. 2, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 3, Brockhaus, 
Wiesbaden 1972  (The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, The Cambridge Edition of 
Schopenhauer's Works, Eng. Trans. by J. Norman-A. Welchman-C. Janaway, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2018). 
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characterized as an “existentialist” one. According to the latter, agency can be 
traced back to two basic possibilities – the affirmation and the negation of the 
will, along with their respective degrees – and these are a function of our intuitive 
and immediate knowledge of the world and its nature. It is also in this context 
that Schopenhauer puts his doctrine of “transcendental freedom” to use by 
claiming that the will is ultimately able to “choose” which of the two attitudes it 
ultimately wants, affirmation or negation.  
Accordingly, I will show that if we only take into account Schopenhauer’s 
theory of agency in a narrow sense, Schopenhauer seems to present an 
irrationalist, determinist and naturalist picture of human agency, whereas if we 
take into account his doctrines of affirmation and negation of the will, we get a 
view of agency that allows more space for the role of subjectivity and self-
knowledge and that appears to be much closer to “existentialist” accounts of 




The first appearance of Schopenhauer’s theory of agency in his published work 
is in the first edition of The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
(which was Schopenhauer’s doctoral dissertation). There are considerable 
differences between this edition and the better-known third and last edition. In 
this paper, I will focus on the latter. Here, Schopenhauer considers the will as the 
fourth type of object of our faculty of cognition, to be distinguished from 
«intuitive, complete, empirical representations»3, from «space and time» as the 
«formal part of complete representations»4, «the forms of the outer and inner 
senses» (ibidem), and «concepts», that is, «abstract representations»5. As its 
own kind of object, the will is subject to a specific form of the principle of 
sufficient reason. Correlated with this object is also a specific kind of faculty of 
the subject: in this case, self-consciousness. The will is, according to 
Schopenhauer, the object of self-consciousness6. As such, the form of the 
principle of sufficient reason that can be applied to the will is what Schopenhauer 
calls the «law of motivation», «the principle of sufficient reason of acting»7. This 
 
3 SG, §17, p. 28. 
4 SG, §35, p. 130. 
5 SG, §26, p. 97. 
6 SG, §41, p. 140. 
7 SG, §43, pp. 144-145. 
 
 
Schopenhauer’s Theory of Agency             Luís Aguiar de Sousa 
 
 




entails, for Schopenhauer, that every act of will has its sufficient reason in an 
antecedent motive. In other words, we feel a priori justified in asking the 
question «why?» someone does something or other8. This is what it means to 
claim that the principle of sufficient reason applies to the will. In fact, in the 
Fourfold Root, Schopenhauer misstates the view he presents in other passages. 
As we will see in due time, the principle of sufficient reason finds application only 
in particular acts of will9. According to Schopenhauer, we cannot meaningfully 
ask why we will in general (ibidem). Thus we cannot say that the principle of 
sufficient reason extends to the “subject of willing” as such10. This ambiguity on 
Schopenhauer’s part is also closely related to the ambiguity in which the notion 
of «object of self-consciousness» is to be found. Although he says that the object 
of self-consciousness is the subject of willing (das Subjekt des Wollens), through 
self-consciousness or through «inner sense», as he also calls the former, we are 
only aware of ourselves in time, that is, in the form of succession and not 
absolutely as we are in ourselves (as a thing-in-itself)11. Thus, we could say that 
the “object” of self-consciousness is not so much the subject of willing as its acts 
appearing in the form of a succession. This notwithstanding, it must also be 
added that we are not aware of ourselves as a “pure spectator” would be, 
indifferent to the fact that, after all, what appears to us in “inner sense” are our 
own acts of willing. This is why Schopenhauer speaks of an identity between the 
subject of knowing and the subject of willing in self-consciousness and even calls 
it the «miracle par excellence»12. Through self-consciousness I, as the subject of 
cognition, am aware of myself as one who wills, that is, as we will see, as an agent 
who feels responsible for his own acts, who feels these acts as his very own.  
Also importantly, that which answers the question “why” regarding acts of will 
are what Schopenhauer calls “motives”. The use of the notion of a “motive”, 
although in many respects similar to our common usage, also deviates from it in 
other specific respects. Motives can be, for Schopenhauer, either the “real” 
objects of intuition – Schopenhauer’s first class of objects – or abstract concepts 
 
8 SG, §43, p. 144. 
9 WWV I, §20, p. 127. 
10 Even the expression “subject of willing” can be contested on Schopenhauer’s own grounds, for 
this expression seems to entail that the subject is somehow detached from his own willing, which 
as such remains a matter of indifference to him. If we want to be strict, there is no “subject of 
willing” but at most an “individual character” that expresses herself entirely through her own acts 
of will. 
11 WWV II, ch. 18, pp. 220-221. 
12 SG, §42, p. 143. 
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and reasonings – Schopenhauer’s third class of objects, although even in this 
latter case they point to real objects and state of affairs. In other words, in its 
technical sense, Schopenhauer tends to use “motives” for objects rather than, say, 
a subjective state. To give a concrete example, if we want to employ 
Schopenhauer’s language of motives in this strict sense, we should say that what 
“causes” or “moves” me to eat is the representation – be it intuitive (perception) 
or abstract (the thought) – of food or of a particular instance, say a piece of fruit. 
In this sense, it is not “hunger” that strictly speaking causes me to eat, but rather 
the sight of food, for example. It is true that, ultimately, I would not feel hungry if 
it were not for a “will to eat”, as part of a more encompassing “will to live”, but 
what explains my particular act of eating is not that I have this “will to eat” but 
the representation, be it intuitive or abstract, of food.  
Thus far, we already know that acts of will have motives and that these are, 
roughly speaking, “objects”. We also know that the principle of sufficient reason 
for acting cannot be applied to our willing taken as a whole. We cannot 
legitimately ask why we will rather than not. To go back to our eating example, 
we cannot ask why we are hungry or are prone to feel hunger, or even why we 
want life in general. This belongs to what it is to have a willing nature and is 
without reason or motive; in Schopenhauer’s parlance, it is groundless 
(grundlos). 
One of the things that are essential to Schopenhauer’s view of agency, and 
which I have not mentioned until now, is the fact that it entails our embodiment. 
Besides being cognizing beings, it is only meaningful to think of ourselves as 
agents as well to the extent that we find ourselves as embodied in the world. This 
point is already implicit in Schopenhauer’s introduction to the second book of 
WWV. There, Schopenhauer says that it is only possible to investigate the true 
nature of the world because we are not only the subject of cognition, «a winged 
cherub’s head without a body»13. What is implicit in this idea is that beyond being 
a subject of cognition, for whom the body is only an object, even if an immediate 
one, we are also the subject of willing. This is in fact one of the points at which 
Schopenhauer diverts from the view presented in the first edition of the Fourfold 
Root. There, he takes the body to be the “immediate object”, both in the sense 
that it forms the starting point of our perception of the world and in the sense 
that it is also the starting point of our acting upon the world – it is the first link in 
 
13 WWV I, §18, p. 118. 
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the causal chain that begins with the will14. Even in his first work, Schopenhauer 
is quick to point out that we are not really acquainted with the “permanent state” 
of the will that precedes the causality of the will upon the body as its immediate 
object15. Five years later, in 1919, on the occasion of the publication of WWV, 
Schopenhauer maintained that the body is the “immediate object of cognition”16, 
but he completely transformed his theory on the relation between body and will. 
As is well known, Schopenhauer claimed from then on that the body and the will 
are exactly the same thing viewed from two different perspectives. The will is the 
body seen from the inside, and the body is the will seen from the outside. The 
ratio cognoscendi of this latter claim is the observation17 that every act of will is 
at once an act of the body. From this observation, Schopenhauer goes on to show 
that the “will as a whole” is the same as the “body as a whole” in every respect. At 
this point, Schopenhauer’s conception of the will was broader than our common 
concept. He claimed that all of our inner states, such as feelings, emotions, etc., 
fall under the concept of the will. In order to provide proof of this, Schopenhauer 
points out that «every impression made on my body also instantly and 
immediately affects my will»; «every violent movement of the will – which is to 
say affects and passions – agitates the body and disturbs the course of its 
functioning»18; «correspondingly, any effect on the body is instantly and 
immediately an effect on the will as well»; pleasure and pain are «immediate 
affections of the will in its appearance, the body»19. It is true that by associating 
the will with the content of our self-consciousness and by broadening its concept 
to include all kinds of non-cognitive inner feelings, the link between will and 
action seems to become looser. This link does not need to be abandoned though. 
Non-cognitive feelings are aimed, in a more or less direct fashion, at corporeal 
 
14 SG1, §45, p. 74. 
15 SG1, §46, p. 75. 
16 WWV I, §6, pp. 23-24. 
17 In the Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer says that the proposition «I see 
each act of my will present itself immediately (in a way totally incomprehensible to me) as an 
action of my body» is «an empirical proposition for the cognizing subject» (FW, II, p. 22), 
although in WWV I Schopenhauer says that the identity between body and will is the most 
immediate cognition, one that cannot really be demonstrated (§18, p. 122). 
18 WWV I, §20, p. 128. 
19 WWV I, §18, p. 120. 
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manifestations, and thus at action, even when it does not result in an effective 
bodily manifestation20. 
As already indicated, for the law of motivation to be applied to the will, we 
must presuppose that the latter manifests itself upon motives according to a rule. 
For Schopenhauer, character is the ultimate presupposition of our motives’ 
eliciting acts of will (or, what is the same, individual actions). Motives are not an 
absolute explanation of an action. As Schopenhauer puts it, they only explain why 
the action had to occur at this time and place. Only the fact that the individual 
will is as it is accounts for the fact that it is liable to act on certain motives and 
not others. According to Schopenhauer, character is a concept that we form 
empirically (taking as a starting point our actions or those of any other 
individual). It lies at the basis of the individual’s various actions as the ultimate 
presupposition of their causal explanation by motives. Although the notion of 
character is empirical in that we are only get acquainted with anyone’s character, 
including our own, through observation, Schopenhauer thinks that the unity of 
empirical character is the manifestation of an intelligible character that, as such, 
is outside of space, time and causality. “Intelligible character” is the a priori unity 
that is completely inaccessible to us but that we must presuppose as existing 
outside the forms of appearance (space, time and causality), that is, as a thing-in-
itself21. 
With this background on the notion of character, it is easier to understand 
Schopenhauer’s point regarding the identity of the act of the will and the “act” of 
the body. Only the act of the body stamps the act of the will, because only the 




I will now sketch in more detail Schopenhauer’s theory of agency as it is 
further developed in paragraph 55 of The World as Will and Representation, in 
 
20 C. Janaway makes a similar point, cf. Schopenhauer on Self and World, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1989, pp. 221ff. 
21 It should be noted that the qualification “intelligible”, although taken from Kant, is at bottom 
completely foreign to Schopenhauer’s philosophical intentions. Kant calls it “intelligible” because 
he considers it to be a “noumenon”, that is, a possible object of non-sensible intuition, a notion 
that Schopenhauer rejects. For that reason, in the first edition of the Fourfold Root, 
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the Essay on the Freedom of the Will, and in chapter 19 of the second volume of 
the World as Will and Representation. 
As I’ve already hinted at, for Schopenhauer, human action ensues from the 
influence of motives on our character: from the way motives drive our character 
towards manifestation. The character itself consists of certain permanent drives 
or aims that, although unbeknownst to us, each of us pursues. Schopenhauer 
sometimes characterizes character as the innermost rule (or even maxim) of our 
conduct22, although it should be borne in mind that this “maxim” is not an 
abstract principle of our faculty of reason that we consciously choose to follow. 
For Schopenhauer, human action does not differ in its nature from non-human 
action. It does not differ even from all “action” in the German sense of Wirken. If 
we take action or acting in the sense of Wirken as the genus, human action is but 
a species of the former concept. What distinguishes human action from non-
human animals’ action is the fact that, whereas the latter act on intuitive motives, 
that is, perceptions, humans are for the most part driven to action by abstract 
motives, thoughts – that is, concepts and judgements. This latter circumstance 
gives humans the ability to deliberate, to ponder various motives in an abstract 
manner, to weigh their influence on our will or character, and to choose 
accordingly. This gives human action a certain circumspection (Besonnenheit in 
German)23 that non-human animals lack.  
The ability to deliberate, to ponder among various courses of action, is also 
called the “ability to choose” (Wahlentscheidung)24. The latter, however, must be 
carefully distinguished from the empirical “liberum arbitrium indifferentiae”, 
that is, a “free choice of indifference”, i.e. the idea that in a given situation two 
opposite actions are possible25. This latter kind of freedom is a mere illusion, 
according to Schopenhauer.  
 
22 WWV I, §20, 127; §55, p. 354. 
23 The new Cambridge Edition does not translate Besonnenheit in a uniform way. It is variously 
translated as “circumspection”, “soundness of mind”, “clear-headedness”, “thoughtfulness”, 
“mental clarity”, “clarity of mind”, etc. The problem is that Schopenhauer employs the term 
mostly in a technical sense. Although all of these meanings may be involved, I think that 
“circumspection” is the best option because Schopenhauer links Besonnenheit with the ability to 
represent time as a whole, that is, the past and the future alongside the present. Besides this, it 
also conveys the idea of being prudent or thoughtful in a practical sense, which is also at play 
here. 
24 WWV I, §55, p. 351; see also FR, §26, p. 97. 
25 WWV I, §55, p. 344. 
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Schopenhauer sees the idea of a “free choice of indifference” as being closely 
linked to his critique of intellectualism or rationalism: the ancient idea, of 
Platonic ancestry, that our innermost essence consists in a rational soul26. If we 
were a purely rational or cognitive being – as opposed to what we essentially are, 
for Schopenhauer: a blind, striving, will – we would will according to our 
cognition. Life would take the form of a purely intellectual problem. We could 
become whoever we wanted to be according to what we deemed best27. We think 
we remain “impartial” before the power of motives and weigh them until we 
reach a completely rational decision. However, to choose among various motives 
is to see which one is stronger, which one “pulls” us more forcefully. For this 
reason, there cannot be a purely rational action, that is, one that is driven merely 
by thinking and weighing reasons for acting (motives). Schopenhauer is thus in 
complete opposition to Kant’s view of agency, in particular Kant’s conception of 
the possibility of a purely rational action, or, in other words, of pure practical 
reason. In order for action to take place, in order for something to become a 
motive for us, another side of us, one that is different from the cognitive one, 
must come into play. Schopenhauer identifies the latter with the will. This 
dimension of our being cannot be rationally accounted for, and we cannot exert 
conscious control over it.  
Although Schopenhauer does not think our action is conditioned by “blind” 
causal factors, he thinks that it is necessarily determined by antecedent motives 
(which are what “cause” actions, according to him). Action ensues with necessity 
from the solicitation of our individual character by motives. In order for an 
individual action to be different, we would have to be a different person, have a 
different nature, in sum have another character. Given one’s individual character 
and the motives that manifest it outwardly, actions cannot be different from what 
they are. Nevertheless, for Schopenhauer, as for Kant before him, the necessity of 
actions has validity only at the level of appearances (Erscheinungen). Since 
human beings are as much a part of appearances as any other natural entities, 
their actions are just as subject to necessary laws as any other entity in nature. If 
we consider ourselves as things-in-themselves, however – in other words, if we 
consider what Kant called our intelligible character, our character as existing 
outside of time, space and causal relations – then we must consider ourselves 
free in the sense that our being is not determined or conditioned by anything 
 
26 WWV I, §55, p. 345. 
27 WWV I, §55, p. 345. 
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else. This is a merely negative notion of freedom (this does not mean that 
Schopenhauer does not have a more positive account of freedom related to his 
doctrine of the negation of the will, as we will see). Thus, our freedom does not lie 
where we usually locate it: in the action (which is, on the contrary, thoroughly 
determined by the motive that elicited it), but rather in our character, in our 
nature, that is, in our being: «Thus freedom, which cannot be encounterable in 
the operari, must reside in the esse»28. In WWV, Schopenhauer claims that we 
have insight into this freedom through the feeling of the “originality” and 
“independence” of our acts of will29. In FW, where he develops this further, he 
locates this feeling in our sense of responsibility. The latter concerns what we do, 
our particular actions, only superficially. In truth, according to Schopenhauer, 
this feeling is directed at who we are, our innermost nature, that is, our character. 
This is also related to Schopenhauer’s contention that the human being “is his 
own work”30 rather than having been made by another (be it God or his parents). 
In this lies Schopenhauer’s deep agreement with existentialist conceptions of the 
human being and action (like those of Sartre), despite their enormous differences 
(in particular Schopenhauer’s more naturalistic outlook).31 
Since our being lies in our character, our will, and since the latter (being 
outside of time as well as all other essential phenomenal forms) does not change, 
the character or “the will as a whole” is immutable, according to Schopenhauer. 
Change only occurs in time, and the will is free of time32. Schopenhauer 
interprets the metaphysical immutability of character as the fact that character is 
inborn33. Changes in behaviour must be ascribed to changes in our cognition of 
motives, which for Schopenhauer includes our knowledge of our situation and 
circumstances. Even if we don’t accept this argument because it presupposes 
Schopenhauer’s general metaphysical outlook, if we accept his account of action 
as the interplay between will or character and the intellect, either we must 
concede that we have a nature (and then everything that we do must proceed 
 
28 FW, V, p. 97. 
29 WWV I, §55, p. 342. 
30 WWV I, §55, p. 345. 
31 In Schopenhauer, the human being «is his own work prior to any cognition» (WWV I, §55, p. 
345), whereas in Sartre the human being is his own work through being essentially pre-
reflectively aware of itself. 
32 WWV I, §55, p. 344. 
33 FW, II, pp. 53ff. 
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according to this nature) or we must conceive of ourselves as being nothing34. For 
Schopenhauer, if we can be said to exist, we have to have a nature, an essence: 
«Free will, precisely considered, denotes an existentia without essentia: which 
means that something would be and at the same time be nothing, which in turn 
means not be, and is therefore a contradiction»35. 
To this point, I have still failed to mention certain very important aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of character. It is not only humans that have a 
character. Non-human animals also have a character (as does everything else in 
nature, even non-living beings). The difference is that the character of non-
human animals coincides with the character of their respective species (despite 
Schopenhauer’s admission that higher animals show some signs of individuality), 
whereas humans have, besides the character of the species, an individual 
character, which is unique to every single person. The fact that humans possess 
an individual character in addition to a general one entails that, whereas animals 
immediately exhibit their character or inner nature through action, humans do 
not. Individuality is also tied to the fact that humans are rational beings36. In 
other words, what they do “in the spur of the moment”, unreflectingly, does not 
adequately express their innermost individual character. Whereas in non-human 
animals desire tends to pass at once into action, in humans there is a gap 
between desire and decision37. According to Schopenhauer, desire only shows 
«what human beings in general, not the individual who experiences this desire, 
would be able to do»38. In other words, desire only manifests the character of the 
species. Through desire we are drawn into every type of human endeavour. Only 
those desires that are mediated through the rational deliberative process and 
issue in a decision are a «sign of individual character»39. Even rational decisions 
can fall short of expressing our innermost individual character, however. If on 
 
34 The latter idea would later be upheld by Sartre, whose philosophy is thus anticipated by 
Schopenhauer, at least as a possibility. Since Sartre holds that as the “being-for-itself” we are 
nothing, as opposed to the “being-in-itself”, which is being proper, he also argues, at least in 
Being and Nothingness, that we are radically free. For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, it would 
be nonsensical to claim that we exist and yet have no nature (which is exactly what Sartre claims, 
based on his interpretation of Heidegger’s idea of the precedence of existence over essence). 
35 FW, II, p. 58. 
36 WWV I, §55, pp. 353ff. 
37 M. Koßler, Schopenhauers Philosophie als Erfahrung des Charakters, in Dieter Biernbacher-
Andreas Lorenz-Leon Miodonski (eds.), Schopenhauer im Kontext. Deutsch-polnisches 
Schopenhauer-Symposium 2000, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, p. 100. 
38 WWV I, §55, p. 354. 
39 WWV I, §55, p. 353. 
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the one hand reason is a condition of individuality, on the other hand it can also 
be an impediment to it. The fact that the human being, as a rational being, has to 
act according to universal concepts disturbs the manifestation of his individual 
character40. This empirical, innate, character is, to begin with, a «simple drive of 
nature» (einfacher Naturtrieb41). As long as we remain unacquainted with our 
innermost essence, we are doomed to zigzag our way through life42. The human 
predicament is that we do not know our individual characters a priori, and it is a 
lifelong task to become acquainted with our individual selves, with what each of 
us basically is as an individual. Our individual character is at first as unknown to 
us as those of everyone else. We must come to know it through experience. This 
means that we can be misled about ourselves, about who we really are. For all we 
know, we may be pursuing certain actions – altruistic ones, for example – only 
because we believe that a certain reward awaits us in another life. Only those that 
“acquire character”43 act in a way that is completely consistent with their 
individual character. They possess conceptual knowledge of the kind of person 
they are. They have achieved self-knowledge. 
It is not easy to reconcile Schopenhauer’s doctrine of “acquired character” with 
the doctrine that human action always takes place according to the agent’s innate 
character. According to him, character always manifests itself in the agent’s life 
course. The difference is that, whereas those who have acquired character 
manifest it in a consistent way, the others end up manifesting it by passing 
through many detours and mistaken paths. Of course, this puts pressure on the 
idea that actions always reflect our will/character. John Atwell has devised what I 
think is an ingenuous solution to this problem, however44. According to him, 
actions that are out of character reflect the character of the agent as a specimen 
of the human race more than his individual character45. Here, one could also add 
that, just as an isolated musical note is meaningless apart from the whole set of 
notes that together make up a certain melody, what is supposed to manifest our 
 
40 WWV I, §27, 181; §55, pp. 357-358. 
41 Cf. WWV I, §55, p. 357. 
42 WWV I, p. 358. 
43 WWV I, §55, pp. 357ff.; FW, III, p. 50. 
44 J. Atwell, Schopenhauer. The Human Character, Tempel University Press, Philadephia 1990, 
pp. 63ff. 
45 Ibid., p. 63: «It follows, I think, that there can be no action “out of character”, where that 
expression means actions explainable without reference to a type of human character; but there 
can be action “out of character” in that I can do actions that need not be explained by explicit 
reference to my unique character».  
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character is our life taken as a whole and not an isolated action, which taken by 




In this section of the paper, I will examine the notions of affirmation and 
negation of the will and probe their relation to Schopenhauer’s theory of agency 
as described thus far. The latter is basically what I, at the beginning of this paper, 
called Schopenhauer’s theory of agency in the narrow sense. As already 
anticipated, in WWV, the notions of the affirmation and negation of the will to 
life significantly transform the framework of his “narrow” account of agency and 
shed new light on it. 
As indicated in the title of book IV, «with the achievement of self-knowledge, 
affirmation and negation of the will to life», Schopenhauer introduces the two 
categories that he will use as a key to understanding the meaning of human 
action and behaviour: the “affirmation” and the “negation” of the will. According 
to Schopenhauer, the aim of book IV is precisely to describe the essence of the 
various modes of behaviour through the guiding thread of these notions in that 
those modes of behaviour are an expression of the affirmation or negation of the 
will in their different degrees. 
The “affirmation” and the “negation” of the will correspond to what can be 
called two different and opposite global outlooks on the world and life (even 
though they are not explicit beliefs). Before we can enter into this issue in more 
detail, we must still define precisely what affirmation and negation of the will are 
and why Schopenhauer uses them as clues to interpreting the meaning of the 
different ways in which humans behave and act.  
To affirm the will is simply the same as willing. Since willing is the same as 
acting, in the sense that it all its manifestations are directly or indirectly 
connected to action (see section II above), the most simple act of will is already 
an affirmation of the will as such: «the affirmation of the will is the constant 
willing itself, undisturbed by any cognition, as it fills the lives of human beings in 
general»47.  
 
46 J. Atwell also likens the agent to the “common feature” that belongs to all of his or her actions 
instead of being a mere bundle of actions (ibid., pp. 38-39). 
47 WWV I, §60, p. 385. 
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In organic beings, all willing can be fundamentally reduced to the “will” of the 
individual to preserve its life and the sexual “will”, which can be seen as the 
ultimate goal of the individual, that is, to contribute to preserving its species: 
 
«The basic theme of all the various acts of will is the satisfaction of needs that are 
inseparable from the healthy existence of the body, are already expressed in it, and can 
be reduced to the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the species»48. 
 
As Schopenhauer puts it, all willing is will to life. Will to life is a mere 
“pleonasm”49; the two expressions are synonymous. This does not mean that life 
is the “object” of willing, as if it were its ultimate, conscious, motive. As 
Schopenhauer makes clear in §29 of the second book of WWV, the will has no 
aim, end or goal. That the will is will to life means, rather, that what 
unconsciously propels willing, its “internal mechanism”, is its blind tendency to 
maintain itself in existence. This means, indirectly, that for Schopenhauer the 
core of our existence lays in our purely biological side. Culture only hides this 
true nature of ours, and most of the human  activities that compose our existence 
in civilized society – perhaps with the sole exception of artistic contemplation 
and creation – aim at filling the void generated by the fact that our fundamental 
will to life is satisfied50 The will to life is a drive for the maintenance of life, or 
simply a drive for existence for its own sake. Of course, in Schopenhauer’s 
grander metaphysical scheme of things, the will to “biological life” is but a 
particular case of the metaphysical “will” to objectivation or existence, which 
operates in natural forces as they strive for matter and “compete” with each other 
to “tak[e] hold” of it51.  
Thus, affirming life in this “natural” sense does not require an explicit stance 
on our part, as individuals, towards life. The latter is rather something that we 
pursue for the most part without being aware of it. (It can be anticipated that to 
“negate the will” can take on the meaning of simply ceasing to will, not willing).52 
Now, despite the fact that, as we have already seen, humans are distinct from 
animals inasmuch as their agency is not solely determined by intuitive, present 
 
48 WWV I, §60, p. 385. 
49 WWV I, §54, pp. 323-324. 
50 See WWV I, §57, p. 369 where Schopenhauer says that “boredom” is the root of sociability. 
51 WWV I, §27, pp. 174-175; §28, p. 192. 
52 In a passage from his later works, Schopenhauer speaks of the alternative between affirmation 
and negation of the will as the alternative between velle (willing) and nolle (not willing). See PP 
II, §161, p. 331. 
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motives and involves an ability to choose among different abstract motives, up to 
now we may have the impression that the individual will as a whole (or character) 
is an ineluctable fact: that each has his or her individual character, and there is 
nothing that can be done about it. As we also saw, however, even if we cannot 
replace our individual character or transform it in any way, Schopenhauer claims 
that we are “transcendentally free”. We saw that this meant, at first merely 
negatively, that the will/character is unconditioned. This idea then became more 
concrete inasmuch as we remain responsible for what we are and a fortiori for 
what we do (since what we do ensues from, or expresses, what we are). The other 
way Schopenhauer puts the idea of “transcendental freedom” to use is directly 
linked to the ideas of affirmation and negation of the will. For Schopenhauer, my 
acting the way I do entails not only that I am responsible for what I am but also 
that I “affirm” the will. Furthermore, it is also with reference to transcendental 
freedom that Schopenhauer introduces the possibility of “negation of the will” 
and “self-abolition [Selbstaufhebung] of character”. If there were no “intelligible 
freedom”, it would not be possible to abolish my character, to negate the will.  
The claim that the account of character presupposes the affirmation or 
negation of the will may suggest that action, the natural expression of our 
individual character, presupposes that we have previously made a “decision” to 
affirm the will. However, at least in the case of what I called the “natural 
affirmation of the will”, we do not make that decision at any time, and nor does 
Schopenhauer hold such a view. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this natural 
“condition” is already one of affirmation of the will. Here, we must go a little bit 
deeper than Schopenhauer himself and make a subtler distinction within the 
concept of “affirmation of the will”. To affirm the will, as Schopenhauer makes 
clear in the passage where he introduces the concept for the first time, is also to 
will life «consciously, deliberately, and with cognition»: 
 
«The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world and 
life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognizes as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition»53. 
 
 
53 WWV I, §54, p. 336. 
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This attitude differs from the first in that it entails a kind of reiteration of what 
we already are, a kind of conscious choice of ourselves, of our ultimate nature. 
What distinguishes it is the fact that the conscious and deliberate affirmation of 
the will involves some degree of self-knowledge, of self-transparency as will.  
Although animals possess consciousness, this does not mean that they affirm life 
in the sense that is at stake here. Schopenhauer makes clear that the will to life 
(the instinct of self-preservation and the sexual instinct) does not depend on 
consciousness, much less on reflectively deeming life to be objectively worth 
living54. 
As for the negation of the will, it has its roots in seeing through the illusion of 
individuation that veils the will as a “thing-in-itself”, that is, in identifying 
ourselves to a greater or lesser degree, and feeling one, with the will as a whole, 
which as such is one and the same in every being. Now, it is not just the negation 
of the will that involves the ability to rise above individuation. The “conscious 
and deliberate” affirmation of the will already entails an overcoming of the 
individual point of view, an identification with nature as a whole, to the extent 
that it is a will to life. What is at stake in this latter sense of affirmation of the will 
is thus the affirmation of our existence as a will to life. The life that was affirmed 
without consciousness, deliberation, and cognition is from now on not only 
accepted but wanted as such. From a more substantive point of view, 
Schopenhauer equates this perspective with what he believes to be the point of 
view of the Stoics and of Spinoza. (We can also see this as an anticipation of 
Nietzsche’s point of view.) For Schopenhauer, to affirm life is to become 
conscious of the eternity or immortality of the will to life, to take some comfort in 
it, that is, to overcome our entrenched fear of death, of ever losing our individual 
self: 
 
«Someone who has thoroughly integrated the truths stated so far into his way of 
thinking, without at the same time having any personal experience or far-reaching 
insight into the continuous suffering that is essential to all life; someone, rather, who is 
perfectly happy and content with life and who, after calm reflection, could wish that his 
life as he has experienced it so far would be of endless duration, or of perpetually new 
recurrence, and whose thirst for life is so great that he would gladly and willingly take on 
all the pain and hardships that life is subject to in return for its pleasures; such a person 
would stand “with firm, strong bones on the well-grounded, enduring earth”, and would 
have nothing to fear: armed with the knowledge that we have given him, he would look 
 
54 Cf., for example, WWV II, ch. 28, p. 402. 
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at death with indifference as it rushed towards him on the wings of time, regarding it as 
a false illusion, an impotent phantom, frightening to the weak, but powerless against 
anyone who knows that he himself is that will whose objectivation or image is the whole 
world, and to which, for this reason, life and the present will always remain certainties, 
the true and only form of appearance of the will; the thought of an infinite past or future 
without him can hold no horror for him, since he regards this as an empty illusion and 
the web of māyā, and thus has as little to fear from death as the sun has to fear from the 
night»55.   
 
Although Schopenhauer does not in any way relate ethics to this affirmation of 
the will – rather, he relates ethical life to negation of the will and affirmation of 
the will to evil – since it involves self-knowledge, overcoming individuality and 
identification with the whole, the way of life of a conscious and deliberate 
affirmation of the will seems to be “ethically” superior to that of the mere 
“natural” affirmation of the will. The reason Schopenhauer does not emphasize 
the “ethical” character of the affirmation of the will seems to be parallel to the 
reason he does not see any ethical dimension in the acquisition of character 
(although the latter surely seems to have it). Those who affirm the will with full 
consciousness still fall short of self-knowledge, that is, of a complete and 
thorough knowledge of the nature of the will. That is, one of the reasons the 
negation of the will is ethically superior to the affirmation of the will seems to lie 
in the fact that the former involves a higher degree of self-knowledge. Although 
they can comfort themselves with the fact that «for the will to life, life is a 
certainty, and as long as we are filled with life-will, we do not need to worry about 
our existence, even in the face of death»56, those who affirm the will still fall short 
of the insight that «continuous suffering is essential to all life». In this way, 
negation of the will seems to be a higher point of view than affirmation of the will 
solely by the fact that it has a higher cognitive value – those who deny the will 
have deeper insight into the true nature of the world. In the case of the negation 
of the will, this insight is, of course, the intuitive grasping of the pessimistic thesis 
that life is not worth living. 
Furthermore, the cognition that is involved in the “conscious and deliberate” 
affirmation of the will to life and, as we will see, also in the negation of the will, is 
cognition of essential aspects of the world as will in different degrees, as opposed 
to the cognition involved in the kind of action that ensues from “blind” 
 
55 WWV I, §54, pp. 334-335. 
56 WWV I, §54, p. 324. 
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affirmation of the will (which is what is described by what I have been calling the 
“narrow theory of agency”). The former kind of cognition seems, at base, to be 
identical with that kind of cognition that Schopenhauer introduces at the 
beginning of book III under the name of “cognition of Platonic Ideas”. It must be 
taken into account that the account of the cognition of Platonic Ideas given in the 
introduction to the third book57 is not necessarily specific to aesthetic knowledge 
and creation and can be seen to be at play in book IV as well, although 
Schopenhauer never goes into detail on this topic in book IV58. He does, however, 
explicitly remark that cognition of Platonic Ideas is at the basis not only of artistic 
creation but also of ethical life, and even philosophy: «[b]oth philosophy and art 
take this cognition [cognition of Ideas] as their point of departure, as does that 
state of mind which alone leads to true holiness and redemption from the world, 
as we will discover in this Book»59. 
In acting in accordance with the intuition of Platonic Ideas, in a sense we do 
not cognize as individuals anymore, but rather from the point of view of the 
whole, sub species aeternitatis, as Spinoza would put it, or as the “pure subject of 
cognition”, as Schopenhauer puts it. This cognition involves overcoming 
individuation and recognizing ourselves to a certain extent as the same will that 
is the essence of everything and of the world in general. This is why those who 
affirm the will consciously, deliberately and with cognition do not fear for 
themselves as individuals, that is, do not fear death and know that «for the will to 
life, life is a certainty»60. However, contrary to what happens in aesthetic 
cognition, we do not remain in a purely contemplative attitude. Rather, we act, 
or, if we come to negate the will, we cease to act, on account of that cognition. 
Although Schopenhauer seems to attribute some degree of reflection to the 
conscious and deliberate affirmation of life, he insists everywhere else that the 
kind of “cognition” that is at play in affirmation, but especially in the negation of 
the will, is not the product of reflection, of reason, and has the character of a 
global insight into the essence of the world and life. Very much like aesthetic 
 
57 WWV I, §§30-35. 
58 This has already been pointed out by some commentators. See, for example, D. Hamlyn, 
Schopenhauer. The Arguments of the Philosophers, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1980, p. 
150 and R. Malter, Transzendental Philosophie und Metaphysik des Willens, Frommann-
Holzboog, Stutttgart-Bad Cannstaat 1991, p. 376. 
59 WWV I, §53, p. 323. 
60 WWV I, §54, p. 324. 
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productions, it cannot be properly expressed in words, in abstract concepts61. 
Just as the artistic genius represents his or her vision of the Platonic ideas 
through the production of a work of art, the one Schopenhauer characterizes as a 
“genius in the ethical sense”62 expresses his “vision” through deeds. The 
parallelism goes so far that Schopenhauer claims that the ethical genius is 
completely unable to put the vision that guides his conduct into words. For that 
reason, he resorts to all kinds of fictitious explanations and dogmas in order to 
account for his action63.  Perhaps for this reason it is the main task of the 
philosopher to describe this practical insight in abstract concepts: «our 
philosophical efforts can extend only to an interpretation and explanation of 
human action and the innermost essence and content of the very different and 




The negation of the will can assume two main forms: that of ethical action 
proper and that of asceticism. The latter can also be called negation of the will in 
the strict sense. (This is not the place for a thorough discussion of the different 
forms of negation of the will and reflection on their identity and differences. 
Below, I will have the opportunity to briefly discuss the relation between ethics 
and asceticism.) Ethical action, on its own, can be divided again into acts of 
justice and acts of altruism (Menschenliebe).65 These, according to Schopen-
hauer, have their origin not in the use of practical reason or in the state’s coercive 
power, but in an intuition that sees through the principle of individuation, an 
insight into the fundamental identity of all beings as will. In the World as Will 
and Representation, and more explicitly in The Prize Essay On the Basis of 
Morals, Schopenhauer also identifies the feeling of compassion (Mitleid) towards 
the other as the form of seeing through the principle of individuation that is at 
play in ethical action. 
 
61 WWV I, §54, p. 336; §68, p. 453. 
62 WWV I, §68, p. 468. The term “ethical genius”, as I am using it here, includes not only those 
who Schopenhauer calls moral or virtuous persons but also all those who are guided by a 
cognition of the whole, including those who affirm the will “consciously and deliberately”. 
63 WWV I, §66, pp. 435-436. 
64 WWR I, §53, p. 321. 
65 Because it connotes a mere feeling towards another human being rather than the idea of acting 
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The affirmation of the will does not remain at the boundaries of our own body, 
does not limit itself to the activities that are essential to the preservation of one’s 
own life and the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. It naturally tends to overstep 
the boundaries of the individual body and negate the will/body of the other, for 
example when I use it in any way to pursue my own ends and interests. Actions 
thereby cease to be morally neutral66. They acquire a moral overtone. The 
negation of the will/body of the other is the essence of the phenomenon of 
wrongdoing (Unrecht), according to Schopenhauer. For that reason, justice 
consists in refraining from negating the will/body of the other. Justice has a 
merely negative status, inasmuch as it is the mere negation of wrongdoing67. It 
should be noted that in order to keep the affirmation of the will within the 
boundaries of my own body a certain negation of the will is required, and the 
latter has its roots, as we have already seen, in seeing through the principle of 
individuation, in intuiting that the separation between me and the other is not 
absolute68. When this intuition goes deeper, we feel compelled to perform acts of 
altruism, by which we try positively to relieve the other from his pain. For 
Schopenhauer, altruism – true, unselfish love – is always compassion69. This is 
so because, according to Schopenhauer, only the pain and suffering of the other 
and not, say, his joy, prompts us to action. When we act compassionately, we see 
through the principle of individuation and for that reason feel identified with the 
other, feel his or her pain as our very own, and take pains to relieve and 
ameliorate it. Here, it is not so much as if we lose all sense of individuality, but 
rather that each of us as individuals will identify with other specific individual 
wills70. Of course, those who choose altruism as a way of life do not identify with 
this or that particular other, but rather with every possible other, and in this 
sense can be said to identify with the will as a whole. It could also be asked to 
what extent altruism is a negation of the will if it does not involve any kind of 
suspension of action, if on the contrary it involves acting for the sake of another 
or others. To this question, it might be replied that negation of the will can, to a 
 
66 J. Atwell, Schopenhauer. The Human Character, cit., p. 95. 
67 WWV I, §62, 400; §66, p. 437. 
68 Cf. especially WWV I, §66, pp. 437-438. 
69 Mitleid; cf. WWV I, §67, pp. 443-444. 
70 In the Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals, Schopenhauer further clarifies the phenomenology 
of compassion and its “paradoxical”, even “miraculous”, nature. According to him, we feel the 
pain or suffering of the other without losing our sense that it is we who are feeling this and not 
precisely the other (GM, §16, pp. 211-212). 
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certain extent, be seen as equivalent to negation of the individual will71. Thus, 
inasmuch as the altruistic will acts for the sake of another will, it must cease to 
act for the sake of its own interests, its own well-being and woe; in other words, it 
must negate its own will. Of course, this still leaves much to be explained and 
answered72. 
Schopenhauer included altruism under the category of negation of the will in 
part because he saw it as being on a continuum with asceticism, as if altruism, 
when radically pursued, led to asceticism. He speaks of the «transition from 
virtue to asceticism»73 and says that the source of altruism and asceticism is the 
same74. However, this should not obscure the fact that there are also very clear 
distinctions between both forms of negation (perhaps only asceticism can be 
called a negation of the will in a strict sense). Asceticism is also based on 
cognition’s being able to triumph over the will. This cognition involves not only 
(as was the case with justice and altruism) seeing through individuation, feeling 
oneself to be one with the rest of the world, but also grasping in a purely intuitive 
manner the meaninglessness of the human condition, the futility of all human 
endeavours. Asceticism is, as it were, the doctrine of pessimism translated into 
practice. 
Schopenhauer acknowledges that besides «mere cognized suffering», there is a 
second path towards asceticism. The latter often takes place as a consequence of 
«suffering felt by oneself»75. In the end, however, even when he is contemplating 
this second possibility, Schopenhauer is quick to remark that negation of the will 
in this case is not a mere “effect” of suffering (in which case it would not be an 
appearance of freedom), but rather ensues from looking at one’s own particular 
 
71 This can be seen as the answer to the objection that altruism is another form of egoism. For this 
objection, see J. Young, Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987, pp. 115ff. and J. Young, 
Schopenhauer, Routledge, Abingdon 2005, pp. 182f. 
72 J. Atwell argues that compassionate action contradicts the identity of body and will 
(Schopenhauer. The Human Character, cit., pp. 142, 183-184, 208-209). However, as Atwell 
himself acknowledges, if we construe compassionate actions as a negation of the (individual) will, 
there is no contradiction. In the latter case, one must view compassionate actions as something 
that transcends the natural order of things, where egoistic agency prevails (ibid., pp. 98, 100). 
The question remains, however, what this non-individual will amounts to and whether it can still 
be called an instance of willing, as Atwell does when he labels it «objective willing» (ibid., pp. 182, 
209). 
73 WWV I, §68, pp. 449f. 
74 WWV I, §68, p. 447. 
75 WWV I, §68, p. 463. 
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episode of suffering as embodying the true nature of life (that is, as a “Platonic 
Idea” in Schopenhauer’s technical sense): 
 
«He only becomes truly awe-inspiring when he lifts his gaze from the particular to the 
universal, when he views his own suffering as a mere example of the whole and, 
becoming a genius in the ethical sense, treats it as one case in a thousand, so that the 
whole of life, seen essentially as suffering, brings him to the point of resignation»76.  
 
This is an occasion to briefly return to the discussion of freedom. According to 
Schopenhauer, there is only one instance where freedom manifests itself in 
appearance. This is the case when “abolition” (Aufhebung) of the will takes 
place77 as a consequence of the complete negation of the will. When the will 
abolishes itself, the body still manifests it, for after all it is nothing but objectified 
will, but the organism no longer finds itself in a state of willing. In this case, 
freedom manifests itself directly in appearance, according to Schopenhauer. The 
problem is that this appears to contradict the idea that every appearance is 
subject to the principle of sufficient reason and, as such, is necessary. In the case 
of the negation of the will, we appear to have something that lacks sufficient 
reason. Schopenhauer admits this contradiction outright. He adds, however, that 
this merely conceptual contradiction mirrors the real one, that of the appearance 
of a will that no longer wills78. Schopenhauer also says that the «key to 
reconciling these contradictions» lies in the fact that negation of the will involves 
an «altered mode of cognition»: 
 
«The key to reconciling these contradictions is that the state in which the character is 
removed from the power of the motive does not proceed immediately from the will, but 
rather from an altered mode of cognition. As long as we are only dealing with cognition 
that is caught up in the principium individuationis and follows the principle of sufficient 
reason, the motive has an irresistible force; but when we see through the principium 
individuationis, we immediately recognize the Ideas, indeed the essence of things in 
themselves, as being in everything the same will, and from this cognition comes a 
universal tranquillizer of willing; individual motives become ineffective, because the 
mode of cognition that corresponds to them retreats, obscured by an entirely different 
mode of cognition»79.  
 
 
76 WWV I, §68, p. 468. 
77 WWV I, §68, p. 467; §69, p. 472; §70, p. 476ff. 
78 WWV I, §70, p. 477. 
79 WWV I, §70, p. 477. 
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This altered mode of cognition corresponds to a cognition of Platonic Ideas, as 
opposed to cognition of motives. Insofar as they are related to action, the Platonic 
Ideas are not motives but what Schopenhauer calls a “tranquillizer” (Quietiv). 
Although Schopenhauer does not avoid resorting to the principle of sufficient 
reason when he suggests that negation occurs as a consequence of our “altered 
mode of cognition”, we could perhaps frame things differently by returning to 
how he describes the methodological approach pursued in book IV. There, he 
says that different modes of conduct are an expression of a “living cognition”: 
 
«Both [affirmation and negation of the will] take cognition as their point of departure 
– not an abstract cognition that is expressed verbally, but rather a living cognition that is 
expressed only through deeds and behaviour and remains independent of dogmas which, 
as abstract cognition, are preoccupations of reason»80.  
 
According to the view Schopenhauer expresses in this passage, the negation of 
the will does not happen as a consequence of a certain cognition but is instead its 
expression. The same goes for the other forms of negation and for all forms of 
affirmation of the will. Each conduct expresses a certain (metaphysical) view of 
the world, even if the agent herself is not aware of it in most cases81. In this way, 
Schopenhauer’s project in book IV can be envisioned as a hermeneutics of 
different modes of conduct, as the project of bringing to light the different 
“cognitions” involved in the fundamental types of behaviour82. 
 
80 WWV I, §54, p. 336. 
81 S. Shapshay argues that there is a “Kantian ghost” of intelligible causality hovering over 
Schopenhauer’s work after his 1814 dissertation. Shapshay highlights in particular the role that 
intellect plays in overcoming the will or character in aesthetic experience, in particular in the 
experience of the sublime and in asceticism, etc. Shapshay construes this as a remnant of Kant’s 
theory of freedom. What I think Shaphsay overlooks is that this overturning of the will’s primacy 
has nothing to do with the Kantian model of the spontaneous, rational agency of intelligible 
character. As Schopenhauer makes clear, the cognition that is relevant to the negation of the will 
is not abstract cognition of reason but rather a type of “practical insight” that is expressed by 
deeds alone. See S. Shapshay, Schopenhauer’s Early Fourfold Root and the Ghost of Kantian 
Freedom, in D. V. Auweele, J. Head (eds.), Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root, Routledge, Abingdon 
2017, pp. 80-98. For an interpretation that, like Shapshay’s, locates the roots of Schopenhauer’s 
theory of freedom and negation of the will in Kant’s theory of freedom, see R. Wicks, Kant’s 
Theory of Freedom in the Fourfold Root as the Progenitor of Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics of 
Will, in D. V. Auweele, J. Head (eds.), Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root, cit., pp. 199-212. 
82 According to J. Atwell, every agent has what he calls a “behavioral metaphysics”, «in that 
everyone, in virtue of his or her behavior and moral character is (say) logically committed to some 
theory of ultimate reality» (Schopenhauer. The Human Character, cit., p. 116). 
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To complicate things further, Schopenhauer – not so much in the first volume 
of WWV but in the second, and also in BM – speaks of an «ethical difference of 
characters»83  and claims that each character is determined by a unique mixture 
of three incentives (Triebfeder), each of which is present in a different degree. 
These incentives are egoism, compassion and malice84. In WWV II85, he speaks of 
a fourth incentive, that of seeking one’s own woe, which he posits as the root of 
ascetic practices. According to this, affirming one’s individual character does not 
necessarily ensue in egoistic actions. One may have a good (compassionate) 
character, a good will, and even the negation of the will can be “naturally” 
explained as an inner tendency of the person in question. Whereas in WWV I the 
value of morality lies in its “cognitive” value, in the fact that moral, and especially 
ascetic, conduct expresses deeper insight into the true nature of things, in GM 
non-egoistic actions are presented as a mere fact of human nature.  
It must be admitted that there is no easy way to reconcile Schopenhauer’s 
original presentation in WWV I with that in GM. One could argue along the lines 
that, since GM’s view does not presuppose Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and is 
merely empirical, WWV I must be seen as expressing Schopenhauer’s definitive 
view on the matter. Here, I will only draw attention to the fact that what from one 
point of view can be traced back to a certain fact – for example, a certain type of 
character – from another, supposedly deeper, point of view can be seen as the 
expression of a certain cognition. Through his character and behaviour, for 
example, the egoist expresses the absolute reality of individuation. The altruist, 
for his part, expresses the view that individuation is not absolute and comes to 
see himself in others. In this way, we can trace the notion of good character back 
to the possession of a certain lived metaphysics. The structure of the Prize Essay 
on the Basis of Morals confirms this interpretation. In that work, Schopenhauer 
starts by exhibiting the existence of a moral incentive through which our actions 
aim toward the good of others. Further on, however, Schopenhauer also points to 
its ultimate condition of possibility, that is, the ultimate identity of all beings and 
the illusory character of individuation. Thus, the moral incentive is traced back to 
the metaphysical insight regarding the unity of everything that exists. 
All this notwithstanding, the idea that cognition saves us from our willing 
condition must be qualified. It is true that cognition is a necessary means of 
 
83 GM, §20, p. 249. 
84 GM, §20, pp. 252-253. 
85 WWV II, ch. 48, p. 697, note. 
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reaching redemption for Schopenhauer, but the will must ultimately be 
responsible for itself, and thus for its condition in this world. Schopenhauer 
himself says that «the effect of the tranquillizer is ultimately also an act of the 
freedom of the will»86 and that the blame for not being able to see through 
individuation must ultimately be placed on the will87. This problem must 
ultimately be traced back to the idea that we do not know the will as a thing-in-
itself as such, but only its appearance as affirmation of the will. What the will may 
be besides this remains completely unknown to us88. Understanding this, 
however, would involve a thorough discussion of Schopenhauer’s theory of 








86 WWV I, §70, pp. 478-479. 
87 See WWV II, ch. 47, p. 690. 
88 See PP II, §161, p. 331. 
